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Case No. 20170026-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

RORY DUSTIN PENCE,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for Violation of a Protective
Order, U.C.A.

§

76-5-108. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.

78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2012).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether the Trial Court errored in denying the Appellant's Motion
to Dismiss arguing the language of "Stay Away," in the Protective
Order is vague under a statutory vagueness challenge.

Standard of Review.

Whether a statute is constitutional is a

question of law that the court reviews for correctness, giving no
deference to the trial court. State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, ,r 30, 40 P.3d 611.
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D
Preservation. Appellant's new argument that U.C.A. § 76-5-108
is vague was not properly preserved because it was not raised in his

•

rJ

D

•

Motion to Dismiss or at trial and it is being raised for the first time on
appeal. His Motion to Dismiss raised the argument of vagueness as

D

applied to the language in the Protective Order.

n.

II. Whether the Trial Court errored in denying Appellant's proposed

jury instruction.

Standard of Review.

A court's ruling on a proposed jury

instruction is reviewed for correctness. State ·o. Campos, 2013 UT
App 213, ,r 21, 309 P.3d 1160, 1168
III.

Whether the Trial Court errored in denying Appellant's motion
for judgment as a matter of law for insufficient evidence.

D

□•
D
[]8
D

•

D

Standard of Review. In reviewing a jury verdict to determine if it
was based on sufficient evidence, the Court reviews the evidence

[]Ci)

presented and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light

[]

most favorable to the verdict. State ·v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah

[J.

1985).

Ll
Ll®

u
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary offacts.

1. Sheri Pence married the Appellant Rory Pence in 1991 and had 4
children during the marriage. Appellant's Exhibit 2, Trial Transcript,

p. 92.

@

s
~

2. Ms. Pence and the Appellant lived iI1. a hon1e in Richfield, Utah during

the marriage. Transcript, p. 91.
3. Ms. Pence filed for divorce and for a protective order against the
Appellant in February 2013. Transcript, p. 92.

~

4. On July 8, 2013, A Modified Temporary Protective Order (hereinafter

I]

Protective Order) was issued by Judge Paul D. Lyman in the Sixth
District Court of Sevier County against the Appellant. Appellant's

rn

D

Exhibit 1.
5. The Protective Order awarded Ms. Pence possession of the marital

(I)

D

home and ordered Appellant to "Stay away from" Ms. Pence, her
vehicle, job, school and marital home. Appellant's Exhibit 1.

D

6. The Protective Order also ordered Appellant not to commit, try to

D

commit, or threaten to comm.it any form of violence against Ms. Pence

~

including stalking, harassing, threatening, physically hurting, or

D
~

-3-
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D
causing any other form of abuse. It also ordered Appellant not to have
any contact with Ms. Pence including mail, e-mail, or communicate in

rt
D

@

any, either directly or indirectly, except for matters related to the minor
children. Appellant's Exhibit 1
7. The Protective Order awarded Ms. Pence temporary custody of the

D

□®

minor children. The Appellant's visitation was to be supervised by

[]

Appellant's parents and to be exercised at their home. Parent time

D®

communication was to be conducted through Appellant's parents.
Appellant's Exhibit 1.
8. Appellant's parents lived directly across the street from the marital
home where Ms. Pence was residing. Transcript, p. 95.
9. On Friday August 15, 2014, an exchange was to take place for

D

ll®
D
®

D

Appellant's supervised visitation of his children. Around 6 p.m., prior
to the exchange of the children, Ms. Pence took her two daughters to

rl@

McDonalds to get dinner. She drove to a park and they sat in the

[]

vehicle to eat their dinner. Transcript, p. 95.

[J.

10. While Ms. Pence and her daughters were eating dinner, she noticed the
Appellant's blue Mustang drive by on a rqad near where they were
parked. It slowed down and she noticed Appellant driving the vehicle.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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lt

The Appellant yelled something at her, revved his engine and then
took off. This incident left her feeling nervous and anxious. Transcript,

p. 96, 97.
11. Ms. Pence then drove back to her home. When she arrived, she noticed
the Appellant standing outside on his parent's porch. Transcript, p. 99,
100.
12. Ms. Pence parked her vehicle in front of the marital home. When she
pulled in she noticed the Appellant's blue Mustang parked in front of
the marital home as well. Transcript, p. 101.
13. At the same time, Ms. Pence noticed the Appellant walk from his
parent's home to the marital home and begin to pace back and forth in
front of the residence. Transcript, p. 101.
14. Ms. Pence was scared as this was not normal for Appellant to come
over during a custody exchange. Normally, Ms. Pence would walk her
children across the street during visitation. Transcript, p. 95, 101-102.
15. Ms. Pence called dispatch and waited for an ?fficer to arrive. During
this time, the Appellant appeared to be coming closer to the vehicle
where she and her two daughters remained. Transcript, p. 102.

-5-
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[]
16. Around 7 p.m. Officer Scott Hatch with the Richfield City Police
Department responded to the residence. Officer Hatch met with Ms.
Pence at her vehicle. Officer Hatch noticed the blue Mustang parked in
front of the marital home facing the front door and the Appellant

o®

n
®

D

standing by the corner in front of the home. Transcript, p. 54, 55, 60, 63,

□®

64.

[]

17. Officer Hatch was familiar with the marital residence, Appellant's
parent's residence, Ms. Pence, the Appellant and the blue Mustang,
and had seen the Appellant, on prior occasions, drive the blue Mustang

O®
D

and parked at the Appellant's parents' residence. Transcript, p. 55, 61,

[t

62, 63.

[]
@

18. While Officer Hatch was conversing with Ms. Pence at her vehicle

D

regarding the protective order violation, Appellant approached Officer
Hatch and Ms. Pence. The Appellant walked right up to Ms. Pence and

n®

as she testified was, "right in my face." Transcript, p. 65, 66, 103.

[J

19. The Appellant told Officer Hatch that he was trying to get his kids and
for Officer Hatch to do his job. Officer Hatch asked him to move his
vehicle. The Appellant told Officer Hatch that, "this is my house, my

I]®

(j

[]®
l]
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0
~

trees, And I park my car in the shade. I don't have to move it. And I

a

will not." Transcript, p. 65.

m
[]
@

□
~

20. During this same time, the Appellant was trying to persuade his
daughters to come with him and even attempted to grab one of his
daughters who was standing near the vehicle with Ms. Pence. The
daughter refused and pulled away. Transcript, p. 66, 104.
21. After argument with Officer Hatch and Ms. Pence, the Appellant then
stated, "that he couldn't stand looking at her face," referring to Ms.

rn

Pence and left the scene walking back to his parent's home across the

~

street. Transcript, p. 65, 66, 105.

□

n
D
@

[]

D
D
~

22. Ms. Pence eventually walked her two daughters across the street to the
Appellant's parent's home. Transcript, p. 66, 105.
23. During the investigation Officer Hatch was able to determine through
dispatch that there was a current protective order in place and that it
had been served on the Appellant. Transcript, p. 68, 69.
24. Officer Hatch also noticed large shade trees in front of the home of
Appellant's parents. Transcript, p. 67, 68.
25.Heather Erskine, a witness for the Appellant, testified at trial that the
Appellant was aware of the Protective Order on August 15, 2014. Ms.

D
~

-7-
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[]
Erskine also testified ~at she was the one driving the blue Mustang on
August 15, 2014 and that she had dropped off the Appellant one block
away from his parent's house in order for the Appellant to avoid
violating the Protective Order. Transcript, p. 127, 130.
B.

Summary of proceedings.
The Appellant was charged with two counts of Violation of a Protective

Order, both class A Misdemeanors under Section 76-5-108, Utah Code. The

•
D
D

Ci

D
□•
11

counts were based upon two separate incidents, one from August 15, 2014

□•

and the second from September 21, 2014. The Appellant was found guilty of

D

the first count and not guilty on the second count at a jury trial on September
23, 2016.

rt
fl

The Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss prior to trial arguing that the

(i)

[]

Protective Order language of "Stay Away" was vague and did not give fair
notice to the Appellant. Appellant's Exhibit 5. The Court denied the motion

[] @)

finding the language of "Stay Away" not vague and that there was sufficient

[]

evidence to allow the case to go to trial. Appellant's Exhibit 3. The motion

[J.

was renewed by Appellant at the close of the State's evidence at trial and was

[j

again denied by the Court.

[]•

lJ
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~

0
~

At trial, the Appellant asked for his version of the element jury

□

instruction to be included. The instruction included additional language not

n
[]

found in Section 76-5-108 of the Utah Code. These elements were added as
numbers three and four which stated: 3) that the protective order prohibited
the conduct Mr. Pence was accused of, and 4) that the protective order

@

D

described the prohibited conduct with sufficient clarity to give a person of

~

ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct was forbidden

a

by the protective order. Appellant's Exhibit 6. Counsel for the State argued
that this was improper to include in an element instruction as it added

~

additional elements not included under U.C.A. § 76-5-108. Additionally, the

g

language cited by the Appellant in the instruction was verbatim language

n
D
@

D

D
D

used in the Appellant's prior Motion to Dismiss dealing with vagueness
which had already been ruled on and denied previously by the Trial Court
See State ·v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1267 (Utah 2015). Therefore, the State
argued this instruction should not go to the jury and especially not in the
form of an element instruction. The Court agreed ruling that it would stick
with the statutory language. Transcript, p, 144-148. The remaining
instructions were stipulated by both parties.

~

D
~

-9-
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At the close of the State's evidence the Appellant asked the Trial Court
for a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law based upon insufficient

o·
D®

evidence. The Appellant argued there was insufficient evidence of the
element of service in the case. The Court denied the motion referring to the

D

State's evidence of a pleading titled "Ruling" issued on July 17, 2013 which

□•

contained language that the Court intended to make the Protective Order

rJ

permanent and showing ·a service date of July 22, 2013 upon the Appellant.

□•

Appellant's Exhibit 9.

D
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant has modified his argument for appeal. He is now arguing
U.C.A. § 76-5-108 is impermissibly vague. This was never argued in his
Motion to Dismiss. His Motion to Dismiss argued the language in the
Protective Order was vague not language contained in U .C.A. § 76-5-108. The
Trial Court never had the opportunity to rule on this issue. The issue was not
properly preserved and should not be heard on appeal.

o·
I]

D
[]®

D

The vagueness doctrine applies to statutes not court orders therefore,

[].

the "Stay Away" language in the Protective Order does not apply. Court

u

orders and statutes are very different as to whom they apply and how they

u·

are written therefore they cannot be analyzed the same way. If the Court were

[]
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~

D
~

to apply the vagueness doctrine to the Protective Order language it would

a

still fail because a statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant

n

cannot be considered impermissibly vague as applied to the conduct of
others. The Appellants conduct showed that he clearly knew what conduct

a

the Protective Order prohibited including the "Stay Away" provision but

D

chose to violate it anyway therefore, the Protective Order cannot be

~
I]

impermissibly vague.

@

~

□

n
□

The Rule of Lenity which states that the court will interpret an
ambiguous statute in favor of lenity toward the person charged with criminal
wrongdoing does not apply because it only applies to statutes that are
ambiguous, not vague. Therefore, the Rule of Lenity does not apply.
The Jury Instructions in this case, taken as a whole, fairly instructed the
jury on the applicable law in the case. The Appellant argues that the court

@·

errored by leaving out his proposed jury instruction. The proposed element

D

instruction by the Appellant flows from inapplicable case law language. It

D
D
~

would have been error by the Trial Court to allow Appellant's requested jury
instruction because it would have been a misstatement of the law and would
have placed additional and non-existing elements on the State in order to
prove its case at trial.

u
~

-11-
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D
Finally, the Trial Court did not error when it denied the Appellant's
Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law because there was sufficient

o·

evidence from the State of service of the Protective Order upon the Appellant.

□@

There was direct evidence of service of upon the Appellant as well as

D

evidence that can be made through reasonable inferences.

ARGUMENT
I. THE APPELLANT DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE THE ISSUE
OF WHETHER U.C.A § 76-5-108 IS IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE, THE
"STAY AWAY" LANGUAGE IN THE PROTECTIVE ORDER IS
NOT VAGUE BECAUSE IT IS NOT A STATUTE AND IT IS NOT
IMPERMISSIBLY VAGUE IN ALL OF ITS APPLICATIONS, AND
THE RULE OF LENITY DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE IT ONLY
APPLIES TO STATUTUES THAT ARE AMBIGUOUS, NOT
VAGUE.

o.
[]

O•
[]

It
[]

a. The Appellant's Argument that U.C.A. § 76-5-108 is impermissibly vague
was not properly preserved because it was not raised in his motion to dismiss
or at trial and is being raised for the first time on appeal.
As a general rule, appellate courts will not consider an issue, including
a

constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the Trial

Court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances.

State -v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358,359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Appellant has modified his argument for appeal. In his original Motion
to Dismiss the Appellant argued that his case should be dismissed because

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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®

[]

n.
[]

I]~
[j

the Protective Order language was vague. At no point was U.C.A. § 76-5-108,
ever mentioned in his Motion to Dismiss or at trial. In fact, in his Motion it
states, "While it is true that the Court's order is not a criminal statute, a
violation of the Court's order 'is a criminal Class A. Misdemeanor."'
Appellant's Exhibit 5.
The Appellant should not be allowed to now raise the issue for the first
time on appeal. The trial court is considered "the proper forum in which to
commence thoughtful and probing analysis" of issues. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d
1268, 1273 (Utah App.1990) (requiring defendants to introduce their request
for state constitutional interpretation before the trial court). By failing to
argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that forum denies the court
"the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law" pertinent
to the claimed error. LeBaron & Assoc. v. Rebel Enter., 823 P.2d 479, 483 n. 6
(Utah App.1991). Because, the issue of whether U.C.A_. § 76-5-108 is
impermissibly vague is being raised for the first time on appeal and was not
properly preserved, the issue should not be before the Court.

b. The "Stay Away" language in the Protective Order is not vague because it
does not come from a statute and it is not impermissibly vague in all its
applications.

-13-
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The vagueness doctrine applies to statutes not court orders. State v.

MacGuire, 2004 UT 4,

,r 12, 84 P.3d 1171, 1174. The Appellant recognizes this

as well because his argument now challenges U.C.A. § 76-5-108, instead of
the Protective Order language. Statutory provisions are completely different

o·
□®
D

from orders. Statutes apply to everyone within the jurisdiction. Orders only

D®

apply to a certain person or persons in a particular case. Statutory language

[]

is written uniform so that it applies to everyone. Orders can contain varying

O®

degrees of language tailored to meet the needs of the case. To analyze a
protective order under the same analysis as a statute would be difficult and

D

incorrect. Because the "Stay Away" language that is challenged is contained

lt

in the Protective Order and not in U.C.A. § 76-5-108, the vagueness doctrine

[]
8

should not apply.
However, If the Court were to apply the vagueness doctrine to the

0

Protective Order language it would still fail. To start the analysis of

n.

vagueness, the Court must start with the premise that '''legislative enactments

[]

are presumed to be constitutional." Greenwood v. CihJ of North Salt Lake, 817
P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). As a result, "those who
challenge a statute ... as unconstitutional bear" a heavy "burden of
demonstrating its unconstitutionality.'' Id. (citations omitted).

n.
[j

□•
[J
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D
~

The court should uphold a facial vagueness challenge "only if the

□

[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." Village of Hoffman

@

~

Estates v. 11ie Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186,
71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). A statute that is clear as applied to a particular

□

complainant cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all of its

D

applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge.

~

Id. at 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (" A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is

@

clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to

[l

~

a

n

the conduct of others.").
The challenged language of "Stay Away" in the Protective Order
cannot be considered impermissibly vague in this case because the actions
and behavior of the Appellant clearly showed he understood what the Order
"Stay Away" meant and what conduct it proscribed.

D

On August 15, 2014, the date the Appellant violated the Protective

D

Order, the Appellant first drove by Ms. Pence at the park and revved his

@

D
LI

~

D
t,

engine and yelled at her. He then parked his car in front of the marital home,
although he had not been living at the home. When he started walking across
the street towards Ms. Pence and the marital home, she recognized this as
something that the he normally did not do during a custody exchange as it
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was customary for her to walk the children to the Appellant's parents' home

D

herself. The Appellant stayed on the corner sidewalk in front of the marital

Pence's face, demanded his children and insulted her by telling her "that he

n®
D
n®

couldn't stand looking at her face." His behavior and actions clearly

[1

demonstrated that he was fully aware of the Protective Order and the

□Cl)

home and paced back and forth close to Ms. Pence and her car but did not
approach her. When Officer Hatch arrived, the Appellant got right in Ms.

meaning of the term, "Stay Away."
This is further demonstrated by his own witness, Heather Erskine, who
claimed that she dropped the Appellant off one block away from his parent's
home prior to herself parking the blue Mustang in front of the marital home.

D

o·
l1

8

According to Ms. Erskine this was done all in an effort to avoid violating the

[]

Protective Order. Although the State does not agree that this actually
occurred, it does show that the Appellant was fully aware of the meaning
"'Stay Away."
The Appellant's statements to Officer Hatch also show that he was very
aware of the "Stay Away" provision but also contradict his own story that he
was making efforts to avoid a violation. When Officer Hatch confronted him
about the Protective Order and moving his vehicle, he stated, "this is my

[l.
[]

ll
ll

1

[j
r~1
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house, my trees, and I park my car in the shade. I don't have to move it. And
I will not." Officer Hatch during his investigation noticed large shade trees
located in front of Appellant's parents' home. These statements and his
actions clearly show that the Appellant was very aware of the meaning of the
"Stay Away" provision in the protective order but chose to intentionally
disobey it.
Because the "Stay Away" provision was clearly not vague as applied
to the Appellant it is not impermissibly vague in all its applications and
therefore is not a vague provision of the Protective Order.
c. The Rule of LenihJ does not apply because it only applies to statutes

that are ambiguous, not vague.
The rule of lenity states that the court will interpret an ambiguous
statute in favor of lenity toward the person charged with criminal
wrongdoing. A statute is ambiguous when "its terms remain susceptible to
two or more reasonable interpretations. State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72,

,r,r 21-

24, 356 P.3d 1258, 1266. In other words, for something to be ambiguous a
person is not sure whether his conduct means X or Y. Both meanings could
be reasonable interpretations of the statute but the Appellant is entitled to the
more lenient interpretation. The Appellant is not arguing that the "Stay
Away" language is ambiguous, he is arguing it is vague. Vagueness has a

-17-
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different meaning than ambiguous. The Defendant seems to treat them one
and the same. However, vagueness, means that conduct falls within the
constructs of a gray area. In other words, it's difficult to determine where the
line is between good and bad conduct. The two theories are very different
and only one can be argued.
Because the Rule of Lenity only applies to ambiguous statutes and not
vague statutes, it should not be considered in this case.
II.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN THE CASE TAKEN AS A
WHOLE FAIRLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO THE
APPLICABLE LAW IN THE CASE.

The Jury Instructions in this case, taken as a whole, fairly instructed the
jury on the applicable law in the case. The Appellant argues that the court
errored by leaving out his proposed provision. At trial, the Appellant tried to

D
•
D

o®
D
□®
D

o~

D

o®
D
@)

include his provision into the element instruction to the jury. The accepted

D

element instruction contained the following instruction to the jury: "before

[]®

you can convict the Defendant guilty of the Violation of a Protective Order, a

[]

Class A Misdemeanor, as charged in the information, you must find from the

~

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that
crime: 1) that on or about August 15, 2014, within Sevier County, State of
Utah, the defendant was subject to a protective order, 2) that the defendant

u
lr
D
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was properly served with the protective order, and 3) that the defendant ·
knowingly and intentionally violated the protective order." Appellee's
Addendum.B.
The Appellant's requested jury instruction had the same language as
the State's jury instruction except it added two additional elements: "that the
protective order prohibited the conduct Mr. Pence was accused of; and the
protective order described the prohibited conduct with sufficient clarity to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct was forbidden by the protective order." Appellant's Exhibit 6.
U.C.A. § 76-5-108 states that: "any person who is the respondent or
defendant subject to a protective order ... , who intentionally or knowingly
violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor". Nowhere in that section does it include the language
requested by the Appellant.
The general rule for jury instructions is that "an accurate instruction
upon the basic elements of an offense is essential. State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7,

,r

14,345 P.3d 1141, 1145. Jury instructions require no particular form so long
as they accurately convey the law. State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262,

,r 23,

219 P.3d 75. To determine if jury instructions correctly state the law, the court
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should look at the jury instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the

D

instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to

□<i )

the case. State v. Painter, 2014 UT App 272, ,I 6, 339 P.3d 107.
The instructions did, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately instruct
the jury as to the applicable law in the case. All of the elements required in
U.C.A. § 76-5-108 were included into the element jury instruction prepared
by the State and accepted by the Trial Court. It would have been error by the

D
□®
[]
[]®

Trial Court to allow Appellant's requestedjury instruction because it would
have included two additional and non-existent elements not contained
within U.C.A. Section 76-5-108.
The requested language m Appellant's proposed jury instruction

D
[]

®

[J
®

comes from his Motion to Dismiss which refers to State v. Rasabout quoting
language contained in United State v. Harriss, 347, U.S. 612, 617 (1954). It

ll

states: "The reason for the principle of lenity is that 'an ambiguous statute

□<i )

violates the notice requirement of due process because it fails to give a person

[]

of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden

[]@

by the statute. Appellant's Motion to Dismiss, Appellant's Exhibit 5,

l]

paragraphs 12-15. This stated language and the language in the Appellant's
proposed jury instruction is the same. The Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was

Lr
[I
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~

denied by the Trial Court prior to trial. It was based upon the rule of lenity

[]

and vagueness of the Order. As discussed above, ambiguousness and the rule

@

of lenity does not apply to this case. Therefore, to include such an instruction

~

would not be an accurate statement of the applicable law.

a

~

□
Ii

The Appellant also argues that by denying his proposed jury
instruction it did not require the jury to make a proper 1nens rea finding. The
mens rea instruction was included in the intent element instruction to the jury
which stated: 3) that the defendant knowingly and intentionally violated the

~

protective order." Appellee's Addendum B.

~

directly from U.C.A. § 76-5-108 and was defined in a separate jury instruction

[]

with language from U.C.A. § 76-2-103. Appellee's Addendum B.

n

This language was taken

Furthermore, the Appellant agreed at trial that the language of
"intentionally and knowingly were sufficient.

D

The Court: S0, we have intentionally and knowingly. Where did you

D

get those?"

~
D

Mr. Van Dyke (Appellant's trial counsel): "They are just from the

~

~

11

statute. They are the same as the prosecution's Your Honor. We just
use theirs. It doesn't matter, Your Honor." Appellant's Exhibit 2, Trial
Transcript, p. 150.

D

Tl
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The Appellant's argument that the jury instructions were insufficient as to
the element of mens rea are being raised for the first time on appeal. He had
no objection to the jury instructions at trial and the Court should not consider
this argument.
In summary, the proposed element instruction by the Appellant flows

n
n®
D
D<i

from his flawed argument that the language in State v. Rasabout was

[]

applicable in the first place. The instructions in this case, taken as a whole,

□®

fairly and accurately instructed the jury as to the applicable law in the case
and the Trial Court did not error in denying the Appellant's proposed jury
instruction.
III.

D

o·

THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN DENYING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW BECAUSE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTED FOR
SERVICE OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDER ON THE
APPELLANT.

The Appellant argues that the Trial Court errored when it denied his
judgment as a matter of law at the close of the State's case. The Appellant
argues that the State lacked sufficient evidence as to one of the required

[Je

elements of the crime of Violation of a Protective Order: that the Appellant
was properly served with the Protective Order.

t]

[j
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If the evidence presented by the State is, as a matter of law, insufficient
to establish the elements of the offense, the Trial Court may dismiss the
charge. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 284 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1090, 110 S.Ct. 1837, 108 L.Ed.2d 965 (1990). Evidence is sufficient, and the

~

denial of a motion to dismiss proper, if the evidence and all inferences that

[]

can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] some evidence exists from

Ci)

IJ
~
~

a

n
a

•

D

D
D
~

0

which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah
1989).
The State offered evidence that the Defendant was properly served
with the Protective Order when he was served with a copy of a document
called, ."Ruling" on July 22, 2013. Appellant's Exhibit 9. A copy of the
Protective Order was attached to the Ruling. Furthermore, the Trial Court in
the ruling makes reference to the Protective Order by stating that it intended
to make the Protective Order permanent. Additionally, Officer Hatch
provided testimony that he was given information by dispatch through the
state system that the Protective Order had been served on the Appellant.
The State also provided other evidence supporting proper service. The
Appellant was living with his parents across the street at the time of the

[]
~
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Protective Order violation and not living in the marital home. Testimony was
given at trial by Ms. Pence that the Appellant did not approach Ms. Pence

•

[]

D@)

until the officer arrived. The Appellant parked his car in front of the marital
home but did not come to the marital home. When confronted by Officer

D

Hatch about the Protective Order he told Officer Hatch to "do his job."

o.

Although this is not direct evidence of service it does show through

[]

reasonable inference that the Appellant was fully aware of the Protective

□®

Order through proper service.
There was sufficient evidence in this case of service upon the Appellant
and the Trial Court's denial of Appellant's motion was proper.

CONCLUSION

D

It
D
(i)

The Appellant raises an issue for the first time on appeal and it should
not be considered. The Appellant now challenges U.C.A. § 76-5-108 for

D

vagueness. This was never argued in Appellant's original Motion to Dismiss

ll,

or at trial. Therefore; the argument was not preserved and should not be

D

considered.

[].

Should the Court find that the issue was preserved and consider the
Appellant's argument, the language in the Protective Order of "Stay Away"

[]

[]·

would not be applicable because it is not statutory language contained in

D
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U.C.A. § 76:-5-108. If the Court were to apply a vagueness analysis to the
Protective Order language of "Stay Away" it would still fail as being vague
because it was clear as applied to the Appellant. The evidence clearly showed
Appellant knew and understood what the "Stay Away" provision meant.
Therefore, it cannot be vague in all its applications and fails a vagueness

n
t l
u

challenge.
The Rule of Lenity which states that the court will interpret an
ambiguous statute in favor of lenity toward the person charged with criminal
wrongdoing does not apply because it only applies to statutes that are
ambiguous, not vague. Therefore, the Rule of Lenity does not apply.

[l

The Trial Court did not error in denying Appellant's proposed jury
instruction because the instructions in this case, taken as a whole, fairly and
accurately instructed the jury as to the applicable law in the case and the

i)

ll
D

u
w

Appellant's proposed instruction flows from his flawed ambiguous statute
and Rule of Lenity argument which was not applicable in the first place. It
would have been error by the Trial Court to allow Appellant's requested jury
instruction because it would have been a misstatement of the law and would
have placed additional and non-existing elem~nts on the State in order to
prove its case at trial.

l1
~1L
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Finally, the Trial Court did not error when it denied the Appellant's
Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law because there was sufficient
evidence from the State of service of the Protective Order upon the Appellant.
There was direct evidence of service of upon the Appellant as well as
evidence that can be made through reasonable inferences.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on September 29, 2017.
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Deputy Sevier Co nty Attorney·
Counsel for Appellee
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76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another -- Violation.
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a
protective order, child protective order, ex parte protective order, or ex
parte child protective order issued under Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1,
Cohabitant Abuse Act; Title 78A, Chapter 6, Juvenile Court Act; Title 77,
Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act; or a foreign protection
order enforceable under Title 788, Chapter 7, Part 3, Uniform Interstate
Enforcement of Domestic Violence Protection Orders Act, who intentionally
or knowingly violates that order after having been properly served, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, except as a greater penalty may be provided in
Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act.
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic
violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties
in accordance with Section 77 -36-1.1.
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76-2-103. Definitions.
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature
of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly,
or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously.
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person. would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that
the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
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COURT ORIGINAL

~
~

DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY, UTAH
845 East300North
Richfield, UT 84701

®

~

D
D

i

Telephone: (435) 896-2700 Fax: (435) 896-2743

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
vs.

RORY DUSTIN PENCE,
Defendant.

I]
~

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Case No. 141600309
Assigned Judge: Paul D Lyman

I
I

Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions given to you at the

I]

beginning of the trial. There also may be additional attached instructions included at a later time

n

in the proceedings. Taken together, these instructions govern your conduct and deliberations
during the trial of this case and must be carefully follovved.

0

Dated this 23rd day of September, 2016.

@}

D

D
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Introduction

Members of the Jury, you have been selected and sworn as the jury in this case. The defendant is accused
of committing one or more crimes. You will decide If the defendant Is guilty or not guilty. I will give you
some Instructions now a·nd some later. You are required to consider and follow all my instructions. Keep an
open mind throughout the trial. At the end of the trial you will discuss the evidence and reach a verdict.
You took an oath to \'well and truly try the issues pending between the parties" and to ''render a true and
just verdict." The oath is your promise to do your duty as a member of the jury. Be alert. Pay attention.
Follow my Instructions.

•

r

The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty and denies committing the crimes. Every crime has
component parts called "elements.'' The prosecution must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Until then, you must presume that the defendant is not guilty. The defendant does not have to prove
anything. He does not have to testify, call witnesses, or present evidence.

r

Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt •

The prosecution has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you
may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact
Is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the prosecution's proof must be more powerful than
that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you
firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is
guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there is a real
possibllity that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.

•

r

D

Information, Plea and Burden of Proof.

The prosecution has filed a document-called an "Information"-that contains the charges against the
defendant. The Information is not evidence of anything. It is only a method of accusing a defendant of a
crime. The Information will now be read.

•

(I)

IJ
D
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D

D

Presumption of Innocence •

Remember, the fact that the defendant Is charged with a crime is not evidence of guilt. The law presumes
that the defendant is not guilty of the crimes charged. This presumption persists unless the prosecution's
evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.

[J

[J'
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Role of Judge, Jury and Lawyers .

All of us, judge, jury and lawyers, a_re officers of the court and have different roles during the trial:

[1

As the judge I will supervise

o

As the jury, you must follow the law as you weigh the evidence and decide the factual issues.
Factual issues relate to what did, or did not, happen fn this case.
The lawyers will present evidence and try to persuade you to decide the case in one way o.r the

o

I

the trial, decide legal Issues, and instruct you on the (aw.

o

other.
Neither the lawyers nor l decide the case. That is your role. Do not be influenced by what you think our
opinions might be. Make your decision based on the law given In my Instructions and on the evidence
presented In court.

fj
@
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Objections.

.

n
n

r

Rules govern what evidence may be presented to you. On the basis of these rules, the lawyers may object
to proposed evidence. If they do, I will rule in one of two ways. If I sustain the objection, the proposed
evidence will not be allowed. If I overrule the objection, the evidence will be allowed.

0

@

Evidence .

As jurors you wlll decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. You must base your decision only on
the evidence. Evidence usually consists of the testimony and exhibits presented at trial. Testimony ls what
witnesses say under oath. Exhibits are things like documents, photographs, or other physical objects. The
fact that the defendant has been accused of a crime and brought to trial is not evldence. What the lawyers
say is not evidence. For example, their opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence.

~
~

r:

.

Do not evaluate the evidence on the basis of whether objections are made.

•

r

Rules applicable to recesses.

From time to time I will call a recess. It may be for a few minutes or longer. During recesses, do not talk
about this case with anyone-not famlly, not friends, not even each other. Until the trial is over, do not
mingle or talk with the lawyers, parties, witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. Court clerks or
bailiffs can answer general questions, such as the length of breaks or the location of restrooms. But they
cannot comment about the case or anyone Involved. The goal is to avoid the impression that anyone is
trying to influence you improperly. If people Involved in the case seem to ignore you outside of court, they
are just following this instruction.
Until the trial is over, do not read or listen to any news reports about this case. Do not do any research or
visit any locations related to this case. If you observe anything that seems to violate this Instruction, report
It immediately to a clerk or bailiff.

~
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Further admonition about electronic devkes .

Jurors have caused serious problems during trials by using computer and electronic communication
technology. You may be tempted to use these devices to Investigate the case, or to share your thoughts
about the trial with others. However, you must not use any of these electronic devices while you are
serving as a juror.
You violate your oath as a jurnr ff you conduct your own Investigations or communicate about this trial with
others, and you may face serious consequences if you do. Let me be clear: do not ''Google" the parties,
witnesses, issues, or counsel; do not "Tweet" or text about the trial; do not use Blackberries or iPhones to
gather or send information on the case; do not post updates about the trial on Facebook pages; do not use
Wikipedia or other internet information sources, etc. Even using something as seemingly innocent
as''Google Maps" can result in a mistrial.
Please understand that the rules of evidence and procedure have developed over hundreds of years In
order to ensure the fair resolution of disputes. The fairness of the entire system depends on you reaching
your decisions based on evidence presented to you in court, and not on other sources of information.
Post-trial Investigations are common and can disclose these improper activities. If they are discovered,
they will be brought to my attention and the entire case might have to be retried, at substantial cost.

•

r

Note-taking .

Feel free to take notes during the trial to help you remember the evidence, but do not let note-taking
distract you. Your notes are not evidence and may be incomplete.

•

r
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Order of the Trial .

I will now explain how the trial will unfold. The prosecution will give Its opening statement. An opening
statement gives an overview of the case from one point of view, and summarizes what that lawyer thinks
the evidence will show. Defense counsel may choose to make an opening statement right after the
prosecutor, or wait until after all of the prosecution's evidence has been presented, or not make one at all.
You will then hear the prosecution's evidence. Evidence Is usually presented by calling and questioning
witnesses. What they say is called testimony. A witness Is questioned first by the lawyer who called that
witness and then by the opposing lawyer.

D

Consider afl testimony, whether from direct or cross-examination, regardless of who calls the witness. After
the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant may present evidence, though the defendant
has no duty to do so. If the defendant does present evidence the prosecution may then present additional
evidence. After both sides have presented all their evidence, I will give you final instructions on the law
you must follow In reaching a verdict. You will then hear closing arguments from the lawyers. The
prosecutor will speak first, followed by the defense counsel. Then the prosecutor speaks last, because the
government has the burden of proof. Finally, you will deliberate In the jury room. You may take your notes
with you. You will discuss the case and reach a verdict.

D
D
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Closing Roadmap .

Members of the jury, you now have all the evidence. Three things remain to be done:
Flrst, I will give you additional instructions that you will follow In deciding this case.

fil

Second, the lawyers will give their closing arguments. The prosecutor will go first, then the defense.
Because the prosecution has the burden of proof, the prosecutor may give a rebuttal.

~

Finally, you will go to the jury room to discuss and decide the case.
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Juror Duties .

You have two main duties as jurors.
The first is to decide from the evidence what the facts are. Deciding what the facts are Is your job, not
mine.
The second duty is to take the law I give you In the instructions, apply it to the facts, and decide if the
prosecution has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
You are bound by your oath to follow the instructions that I give you, even if you personally disagree with
them. This includes the instructions I gave you before trial, any instructions I may have given you during
the trial, and these instructions. All the instructions are important, and you should consider them as a
whole. The order In which the instructions are given does not mean that some Instructions are more
important than others. Whe.ther any particular instruction applies may depend upon what you decide are
the true facts of the case. If an Instruction applies only to facts or circumstances you find do not exist, you
may disregard that instruction.

D

Perform your duties fairly. Do not let any bias, sympathy or prejudice that you may feel toward one side or
the other influence your decision In any way. You must also not let yourselves be influenced by public
opinion.
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Elements of Count I

Before you can convict the Defendant of VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, a Class A
Misderneanot, as charged in the Information, you must find frorn the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, all of the fo11owing elements of that crime:

1. That on or about August 15, 2014, within Sevier County, State of Utah, the Defendant
was subject to a Protective Order;
2. That t~e Defendant was properly served with the Protective Order; and
3. That the Defendant knowingly or intentionally violated the Protective Order.
If, after weighing all the available evidence, you are satisfied that all of the above elements
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant guilty. If,
however, you are not satisfied, that each element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the Defendant'luilty.
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• Elements of Count II
Before you can convict the Defendant of VIOLATION OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, a Class A

Misdemeanor, as charged in the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime:

J. That on or about September 21, 2014, within Sevier County, State of Utah, the
.Defendant was subject to a Protective Order;
2. That the Defendant was property served with the Protective Order; and
.3. That the Defendant knowingly or intentionally violated the Protective Order.
If, after weighing all the available evidence, you are satisfied that all of the above elements
have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant guilty. If,

however, you are not satisfied that each element has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the Defendant'1'tiilty.
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Intentional and Knowing Conduct

A person engages in conduct:

(1) Intentionally, or With intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowingly, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

D
i)

D

~
[]
[]

1]

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

D
•

r

Closing Arguments .

When the lawyers give their closing arguments, keep in mind that they are advocating their views of the
case. What they say during their closing arguments Is not evidence. If the lawyers say anything about the
evidence that conflicts with what you remember, you are to rely on your memory of the evidence. If they
say anything about the law that conflicts with these Instructions, you are to rely on these instructions.
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Legal Rulings .

During the trial I have made certain rulings. I made those rulings based on the law, and not because I
side or the other.

favor one

However,
o
o

o

If I sustained an objection,
ff I did not accept evidence offered by one side or the other, or
if I ordered that certain testimony be stricken,

then you must not consider those things in reaching your verdict.
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Judicial Neutrality .

As the judge, I am neutral. If I have said or done anything that makes you think I favor one side or the
other, that was not my intention. Do not Interpret anything 1 have done as indicating that I have any
particular view of the evidence or the decision you should reach.
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Evidence-Closing .

You must base yo~r decision only on the evidence that you saw and heard here in court.
Evidence includes:
o
o

what the witnesses said while they were testifying under oath; and
any exhibits admitted Into evidence.

Nothing else Is evidence. The lawyers statements and arguments are not evidence. Their objections are not
evidence. My legal rulings and comments, if any, are not evidence.

In reaching a verdict, consider all the evidence as I
draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence.

have defined it here, and nothing else. You may also
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Witness Credibility .

In deciding this case you will need to decide how believable each witness was. Use your judgment and
common sense. Let me suggest a few things to think about as you weigh each witness's testimony:
o

How good was the witness's opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise observe what the witness
testified about?

o

Does the witness have something to gain or lose from this case?

o
o

Does the witness have any connection to the people involved In this case?

o
o
o

o

Does the witness have any reason to lie or slant _the testimony?
Was the witness's testimony consistent over time? If not, is there a good reason for the
inconsistency? If the witness was inconsistent, was it about something important or unimportant?
How believable was the witness's testimony In light of other evidence presented at trial?
How believab1e was the witness's testimony In light of human experience?
Was there anything about the way the witness testified that made the testimony more or less
believable?

D

In deciding whether or not to believe a witness, you may also consider anything else you think is
Important.
You do not have to believe everything that a witness said. You may believe part and disbelieve the rest. On
the other hand, if you are convinced that a witness lied, you may disbelieve anything the witness said. In
other words, you may believe all, part, or none of a witness's testimony. You may believe many witnesses
against one or one witness against many.

□

In deciding whether a witness testified truthfully, remember that no one's memory is perfect. Anyone can
make an honest mistake. Honest people may remember the same event differently.
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Presumption of Innocence-Closing .

Remember, the fact that the defendant is charged with a crime is not evidence of guilt. The Jaw presumes
that the defendant is not guilty of the
mes charged. This presumption persists unless the prosecution's
evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.
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Reasonable Doubt-Closing .

D

As I instructed you before proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the
defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in
criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If the evidence leaves
you firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find the defendant
"gullty." On the other hand, if there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give the defendant
the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict of "not guilty."
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Direct/Circumstantial Evidence .

Facts may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. The law does not treat one type of evidence as
better than the other.
Direct evidence can prove a fact by itself. It usually comes from a witness ·who perceived firsthand the fact
in questJon. For example, if a witness testified he looked outside and saw it was raining, that would be
direct evidence that it had rained.
Circumstantial evidence is Indirect evidence. It usually comes from a Witness who perceived a set of
related events, but not the fact In question. However, based on that testimony someone could conclude
that the fact in question had occurred. For example, if a witness testified that she looked outside and saw
that the ground was wet and people were closing their umbrellas, that would be circumstantiai evidence
that it had rained.
,

Before you can find the defendant guilty of any charge, there must be enough evidence-direct,
circumstantia·1, or some of both-to convince you of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It Is
up to you to decide.
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Defendant Not Testifying .

A person accused of a crime may choose whether or not to tes_tify. In this case the defendant chose not to
testify. Do not hold that choice against the defendant. Do not try to guess why the defendant chose not to
testify, Do not consider it in your deliberations. Decide the case only on the basis of the evidence. The
defendant does not have to prove that he or she is not guilty. The prosecution must prove the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Do Not Consider Punishment.

In making your decision, do not consfder what punishment could result from a verdict of guilty. Your duty
is to decide if the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Punishment is not relevant to whether
the defendant is guilty or not guilty.
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Jury Deliberations .

D
•
D

In the jury room, discuss the evidence and speak your minds with each other. Open discussi_on should help
you reach a unanrmous agreement on a verdict. Listen carefully and respectfully to each other's views and
keep an open mincf about what others have to say. I recommend that you not commit yourselves to a
particular verdict before discussing all the evidence.

Try to reach unanimous agreement, but only if you can do so honestly and in good conscience. If there ls a
difference of opinion about the evidence or the verdict, do not hesitate to change your mind if you become
convinced that your position is wrong. On the other hand, do not give up your honestly held views about
the evidence simply to agree on a verdict, to give in to pressure from other jurors, or just to get the case
over with. In the end, your vote must be your own.
Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree with the verdict before the defendant can be
found ''guilty" or "not gullty." In reaching your verdict you may not use methods of chance, such as
drawing straws or flipping a coin. Rather, the verdict must reflect your individual, careful, and
conscientious judgment as to whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor proved each charge
beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Foreperson Selection and Duties .

Among the first things you should do when you go to the jury room to deliberate Is to appoint someone to
serve as the jury foreperson. The foreperson should not dominate the jury's discussion, but rather should
facllitate the discussion of the evidence and make sure that all members of the jury get the chance to
speak. The foreperson's opinions should be given the same weight as those of other members of the jury.
Once the jury has reached a verdict, the foreperson Is responsible for filling out and signing the verdict
form on behalf of the entire jury.
For each offense, the verdict form will have two blanks-one for nguilty'; and the other for "not guilty." The
foreperson will fill in the appropriate blank to reflect the jury's unanimous decision. In filling out the form,
the foreperson needs to make sure that only one blank is marked for each charge.
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